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Abstract:  
 
 
This article provides a new approach to the study of global values, based on a 
statistical analysis of the freely available data from the World Values Survey, 6
th
 
wave of global opinion surveys, which has now been made public. In 
accordance with economic approaches, we contradict the mainstream of the 
hitherto published global value analyses in sociology (Ronald F. Inglehart) and 
we think that family values (Schumpeter) and religious values (Barro) can be an 
important positive asset for society. Too many negative phenomena, which 
cannot be overlooked anymore by contemporary social science are clearly to be 
associated with the loss of religion (irrespective of the predominant 
denomination in a country): the distrust in the state of law; the shadow 
economy; the distance from altruistic values; a growing fatigue of democracy; 
the lack of entrepreneurial spirit; et cetera.  
 
We provide global maps for the new 22 value factors which result from the 
promax factor analysis of 78 variables from 45 countries with complete data, 
and we also calculate performance indices for the countries and the nine main 
global religious denominations, answering an old query raised by Huntington, 
1996. On this account, the 5775 year old religion of Judaism and also Christian 
Protestantism emerge as the role models for other religions how to combine 
religion and the traditions of the Enlightenment. Interestingly enough, also 
Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism and Roman Catholicism are assigned a positive 
value on our combined twelve factor indicator. Religiously committed 
Protestants and Roman Catholics who assign a greater importance to G’d in their 
life rank better on our scale than do the overall global Protestant and Roman 
Catholic populations. 
 
Keywords: Index Numbers and Aggregation; Economic Integration; 
International Relations and International Political Economy; Religion  
 
JEL Classification: C43, F15, F5, Z12  
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Social science studied cross-national survey data with statistical methods to gain 
insights about global value patterns for a number of years. Our survey of the 
theories and hitherto carried out empirical studies will be rather brief and 
because of sparse available journal printing space, we would rather like to 
concentrate here on the new results which we will present. For this reason, our 
article departs substantially from the usual presentation style in the social 
science journals and rather adheres to the style in the medical profession as a 
model to follow. 
 
 
1. Background 
 
 
The discipline of global value research made enormous methodological 
developments over the last decades and is now an integral part of global 
sociology (Davidov, Schmidt and Billiet, 2011; Davidov, Schmidt and Schwarz, 
2008). Inglehart initiated repeated and constant standard surveys over time in the 
Eurobarometer 
1
 project and the World Values Survey. 
2
 Regional coverage of 
the World Values Survey project quickly transcended developed Western 
democracies to include in wave 1, 1981-84 South Korea and Mexico; and in 
wave 2, 1990-1994 a number of former communist and also developing 
countries. World Values Survey data are now available from 100 countries which 
contain some 90 percent of the world’s population, still using a largely common 
and stable questionnaire with almost 400,000 representative respondents. 
3
 
There was also a growing inclusion of representative Muslim publics in these 
surveys (Tausch and Moaddel, 2009; Tausch, Heshmati and Karoui, 2014; 
Yesilada and Noordijk, 2010). Never before in human history have we known as 
much about the values and cultures across the globe, and never before have we 
known as much about the changes of values and cultures over time. 
 
In the West, three social scientific traditions gained an overwhelming 
prominence in the interpretation of global values: G. Hofstede, S. Schwartz, and 
R. Inglehart. Hofstede, who pioneered value research in international business 
studies (Hofstede, 2001; Hofstede and Minkov, 2010; Hofstede, Hofstede and 
Minkov, 2010; Minkov and Hofstede, 2011, 2013) underlines the fundamental 
insight that transferring global production and doing international business 
needs a thorough study of the differences in international values of employees 
and customers alike. According to Hofstede there are four to six basic clusters 
of international value systems, and they are all defined along the scales of how 
different national societies handle ways of coping with inequality, ways of 
                                                 
1
 http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm 
2
 http://lcsr.hse.ru/en/inglehart 
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coping with uncertainty, the relationship of the individual with her or his 
primary group, and the emotional implications of having been born as a girl or 
as a boy. Among Hofstede’s factors, power distance (lowest in Scandinavian 
and in the Anglo-Saxon democracies), uncertainty avoidance (generally highest 
in Roman Catholic and Orthodox cultures), and long-term orientation (LTO) 
(highest in South Korea, Japan, and China) are especially often mentioned in the 
literature. 
 
Schwartz, 2006 highlights a famous map of global values. Schwartz identifies 
seven basic cultural orientations and the structure of interrelations among them: 
West European, English-speaking, Latin American, East European, and South 
Asian, Confucian influenced, and African and Middle Eastern. 
 
His seven country-level cultural dimensions are  
 
1. Embeddedness 
2. Hierarchy 
3. Mastery 
4. Affective Autonomy 
5. Intellectual Autonomy 
6. Egalitarianism 
7. Harmony 
 
Muslim societies rank very high on values of embeddedness. Embeddedness 
combines such values as social order, respect tradition, forgiving, moderateness, 
obedience, politeness, cleanness, national security, devoutness, wisdom, self-
discipline, family security, honoring elders, reciprocation of favors, protecting 
the public image.  
 
Inglehart predicted a more or less generalized global increase in human security 
in parallel with the gradual waning of the religious phenomenon in the majority 
of countries across the globe. Inglehart spells out what tendencies are brought 
about by the waning of the religious element in advanced western democracies: 
higher levels of tolerance for abortion, divorce, homosexuality; the erosion of 
parental authority, the decrease of the importance of family life et cetera 
(Inglehart and Baker, 2000; Inglehart and Norris, 2003).  
 
Inglehart and Baker, 2000, which has become a true classic of the social 
sciences today, quoted none the less than 3256 times in the literature, 
4
 
developed an interpretation of global value change which rests – like our present 
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article - on the statistical technique of factor analysis. Inglehart used up to some 
twenty key World Values Survey variables, mostly from the waves (1) to (4) of 
the project. As it is all too well-known, the two Inglehart dimensions are: (1) the 
Traditional/ Secular-Rational dimension and (2) the Survival/Self-expression 
dimension. These two dimensions also explain more than 70 percent of the 
cross-national variance in another Inglehart factor analysis of ten indicators, and 
each of these dimensions is strongly correlated with scores of other important 
variables. For Inglehart and Baker, 2000 all of the preindustrial societies show 
relatively low levels of tolerance for abortion, divorce, and homosexuality; tend 
to emphasize male dominance in economic and political life, deference to 
parental authority, and the importance of family life, and are relatively 
authoritarian; most of them place strong emphasis on religion. Advanced 
industrial societies tend to have the opposite characteristics.  
 
When survival is uncertain, cultural diversity seems threatening. When there 
isn't "enough to go around," foreigners are seen as dangerous outsiders who may 
take away one's sustenance. People cling to traditional gender roles and sexual 
norms, and emphasize absolute rules and familiar norms in an attempt to 
maximize predictability in an uncertain world. Conversely, when survival begins 
to be taken for granted, ethnic and cultural diversity become increasingly 
acceptable - indeed, beyond a certain point, diversity is not only tolerated, it may 
be even positively valued because it is seen as interesting and stimulating. In 
advanced industrial societies, people seek out foreign restaurants to taste new 
cuisine; they pay large sums of money and travel long distances to experience 
exotic cultures. Changing gender roles and sexual norms no longer seem 
threatening.  
 
In this article we will analyse the weight of such factors as the loss of religion 
and the rise of the shadow economy, including in leading Western countries, and 
we start out from a frame of reference which was provided by the American 
economist Robert Barro, who thinks that religion does affect economic 
outcomes mainly by fostering religious beliefs that influence individual traits 
such as thrift, work ethic, honesty, and openness to strangers. For Barro, beliefs 
in heaven and hell might affect these traits by creating perceived rewards and 
punishments that relate to “good” and “bad” lifetime behavior. The networks 
and interactions fostered by churches and religious denominations are important 
elements of social capital.  
 
For Inglehart, such phenomena as bribery, corruption, tax evasion, cheating the 
state to get government benefits for which one wouldn’t be entitled, but also the 
healthy activism of citizens in volunteer organizations, already described by 
Amitai Etzioni, hardly exist, while the rich data base of the World Values Survey 
provides ample evidence about these phenomena and their occurrence in world 
society. Our statistics and choropleth maps of global value adherence underline 
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a preoccupation about the loss of spiritual values, which also unites leaders of 
the major world religious denominations. 
5
 As Rabbi Lord Jonathan Sacks in 
his address at the Pontifical Gregorian University on December 12, 2012 in 
Rome correctly highlighted, the religious roots of the market economy and of 
democratic capitalism can never be forgotten:  
 
“They were produced by a culture saturated in the values of the Judaeo-
Christian heritage, and market economics was originally intended to advance 
those values.” 6 
 
And Rabbi Lord Sacks went on to underline the following aspect, which 
achieves highest significance in our own empirical results: 
 
“But trust is not a dispensable luxury. It is the very basis of our social life. Many 
scholars believe that capitalism had religious roots because people could trust 
other people who, feeling that they were answerable to God, could be relied on 
to be honest in business. A world without trust is a lonely and dangerous place. 
[…] In the end we do not put our faith in systems but in the people responsible 
for those systems, and without morality, responsibility, transparency, 
accountability, honesty and integrity, the system will fail.” 7 
 
Lord Sacks argues also that affluence makes you complacent. You no longer 
have the moral and mental energy to make the sacrifices necessary for the 
defense of freedom. Inequalities grow. The rich become self-indulgent. The poor 
feel excluded. There are social divisions, resentments, injustices. Society no 
longer coheres. People do not feel bound to one another by a bond of collective 
responsibility. Individualism prevails. Trust declines. Social capital wanes.  
 
“Those who believe that liberal democracy and the free market can be defended 
by the force of law and regulation alone, without an internalised sense of duty 
and morality, are tragically mistaken.” 8 
 
Secularization is part and parcel of the decay of family values and economic 
values, which threaten to affect negatively the very existence of the capitalist 
market economy. This simple and compelling message from one of the greatest 
                                                 
5
 http://www.peace.ca/concludingstatement.htm and 
http://www.catholiceducation.org/en/religion-and-philosophy/social-justice/has-europe-lost-
its-soul.html  
6
 http://www.catholiceducation.org/en/religion-and-philosophy/social-justice/has-europe-lost-
its-soul.html  
7
 http://www.catholiceducation.org/en/religion-and-philosophy/social-justice/has-europe-lost-
its-soul.html  
8
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economists of all times, Joseph Alois Schumpeter was already published in 
1950. For Schumpeter, the loss of family values destroys the fabric of capitalist 
family owned businesses. Today we can add: if overall values decline, then, also 
tax morale and the human work ethic, considered to be so vital for economic 
progress since the days of the German sociologist Max Weber, will decline as 
well.  
 
The economics profession, that is, mathematical, quantitative economics, 
already began to make large-scale use of the World Values Survey data, 
integrating the World Values Survey country level results into international 
economic growth accounting.  
 
Following Hayek and Barley, 1988 and Hayek, 1960, we think that values like 
hard work which brings success, competition, and private ownership of business 
play an overwhelming role in 21
st
 Century Capitalism, and simply cannot be 
overlooked in empirical global value research. 
 
Starting with the usual World Bank economic growth data (as of March 2015), 
we immediately see that the centers of economic growth since the crisis of 2008 
shift inexorably towards the countries of the Pacific and the Indian Ocean arena, 
and away from the secularized West. Even in their wildest anti-Western dreams, 
the opponents of the West would not have been able to imagine what has come 
true today – the tremendous reduction of Western economic power. What radical 
Islamist movements could hitherto not achieve – the undermining of Western 
military power – the economic crisis and the rise of new economic global 
players accomplished within the timespan of a few years. Not the bombs of Mr. 
Osama Ben Laden, but the relentless economic crisis starting in 2007 achieved 
this decline. 
 
Barro speaks decidedly in favor of the importance of religion for sound 
economic growth and long-run economic well-being. Barro and McCleary, 
2003, instead of viewing ‘religious beliefs’ as an ‘impediment’ of economic 
growth, tend to see them as requirements of a resilient society today:  
 
‘Our central perspective is that religion affects economic outcomes mainly by 
fostering religious beliefs that influence individual traits such as thrift, work 
ethic, honesty, and openness to strangers. For example, beliefs in heaven and 
hell might affect these traits by creating perceived rewards and punishments 
that relate to “good” and “bad” lifetime behavior.’ 
 
Religious beliefs stimulate growth because they help to sustain aspects of 
individual behavior that enhance productivity. Respect of parents is related in a 
clear-cut positive manner to economic growth, as well as the belief in hell. Our 
Appendix Map 1 projects the World Bank average economic growth rates since 
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the world economic crisis began in 2008. Poor countries grow faster than richer 
countries, but we also show how even under consideration of prior economic 
development levels, economic growth inexorably shifts towards the Pacific and 
Indian Ocean region. 
 
The decline of “economic morality” has many visible results – the shadow 
economy, bribery, corruption et cetera. The economic profession already 
invested lots of energy over recent years to investigate these phenomena (Tanzi 
and Schunecht, 1997; Tanzi, 1999; Schneider, 2005). Hofstede, 
Schwartz/Davidov and Inglehart, the three major existing sociological and 
psychological theories about global values do not talk about the shadow 
economy at all.  
 
The present author is of course well aware of the vast debate on religion and 
globalization in the context of the theories, debated above (Beyer and Beaman, 
2007; Sen 2006). Eisenstadt (1968) already underlined the pivotal role of 
Protestantism in the rise of the Enlightenment traditions in the West. In 
accordance with Guiso et al., 2003, we think that Eisenstadt’s theory deserves a 
more than passing mentioning here, because Eisenstadt (1968) moved away 
from an analysis of a direct causal link between Protestantism and capitalism to 
focus on the ‘‘transformative potential’’ of religions.  
 
The transformative potential is defined by Eisenstadt as the ‘‘capacity to 
legitimize, in religious or ideological terms, the development of new 
motivations, activities, and institutions which were not encompassed by their 
original impulses and views” (Eisenstadt, 1968). As Guiso et al. correctly 
emphasized, Eisenstadt’s main contribution in the context of the debate was to 
show that Protestantism redefined political and social institutions, and impacted 
on the reformulation of roles within the economic sphere.  
 
In view of the global quest for an ethics of tolerance and understanding (Küng, 
1997), one might also argue that starting from Montesquieu (Montesquieu, 
1989) in the Western Christian tradition, Enlightenment would be indeed 
inseparable from the development of a culture of tolerance and the market 
economy (Allen, 2008; Holmes, 2006; just to mention a few). Important 
traditions of Enlightenment in other world religions – to name here only Judaism 
and Islam, without neglecting the other global religions – must also be named in 
this context (Feiner and Naor, 2011; Lawson, 2005; Morgan, 2007; Sacks, 1998, 
2003, 2005, 2014). Europe’s dominant denomination, Roman Catholicism, only 
joined the traditions of Enlightenment in the Second Vatican Council (Lehner 
and O'Neill Printy, 2010). And while the Roman Catholic Church now 
forcefully condemns Anti-Semitism, it is still ambivalent at best on the “second 
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pillar” of its Anti-Enlightenment prejudice, 9 which targeted Free Masonry 
(Lenoir and Etchegoin, 2009).  
 
But for empirical economists, who are not primarily in sacred scriptures 
but in economic behavior of human beings, the evidence published on the 
relationship between religion, denominations, societal ethics and economic 
growth is far from clear and conclusive. There are, if one wishes to say so, 
different shades of very contradicting evidence, and among the dozens and 
dozens of articles and books published on the subject, we should just mention 
the influential articles Berggren and Bjørnskov, 2011, who found a negative 
relationship between religiosity and trust; Porta et al., 1996, who distinguished 
between the effects of what they term hierarchical religions (a debate started by 
Putnam, 1993 and Fukuyama, 1995; defined in the article by Porta et al. as 
Catholicism, Eastern Orthodox Christianity, and Islam) and Guiso et al., 2003; 
Knack and Keefer, 1997; Sapienza et al., 2006; and Zak and Knack, 2001; who 
all arrived at a more complex picture of realities. Guiso et al., 2003 is an 
especially noteworthy source in this context, because the article is based on a 
very comprehensive analysis of the World Values Survey data, which were 
available to the authors at the time of the writing of their article. Only a very 
limited number of conclusions of that article can be debated here: Guiso et al., 
2003 found that on average religion is good for the development of stronger 
institutions. Religious people trust others more, trust the government more, 
are less willing to break the law, and believe more in the fairness of the 
market. Active churchgoers are not more intolerant toward immigrants 
than the rest of the population. Finally, both a religious upbringing and active 
religious participation increase trust toward government institutions. Religious 
upbringing and affiliation are associated with a reduced willingness to break any 
sort of legal rule. People attending religious services on a more regular basis are 
more willing to trade off equality for incentives and in particular, they favor 
more private ownership. Catholicism breeds trust more than any other non-
Christian religion.  
 
The main theoretical connections of the present new approach to global value 
studies could then be summarized as follows: 
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Graph 1: Religions in the tradition of the Enlightenment and global values 
– the causal connections 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Data and Methodology  
 
 
Human value data collections now include data from much of the Americas, 
Europe and the former USSR, East and South-East Asia and several countries in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, and also from twenty majority Muslim countries of our 
globe, now participating in the last wave of the World Values Survey project. 
 
Our present attempt to map anew the structure of global values is based on an 
extensive and ehaustive approach of the 78 best documented variables in the 
World Values Survey (6), based on 41178 global representative citizens with 
complete data who reside in none the less than 45 countries. Our multivariate 
analysis thus covers roughly some 47% of the total global population of 7.303 
currently billion people and it also comprises some 580 Muslim inhabitants of 
our globe, i.e. around 36% of the global Muslim population of more than 1.6 
 11 
billion people. 
10
 The fifteen member countries of the Organization of Islamic 
Cooperation, 
11
 covered by our final multivariate analysis are: Algeria, 
Azerbaijan, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, Tunisia, Turkey, Uzbekistan, and Yemen. The full list of 
countries, entered into the final analysis emerges from Table 3. 
 
Our variables include a wider array of values than in any previous encompassing 
analysis on the subject. We also include necessary background data such as age, 
education, gender, and income of the respondents. The fifteen categories of 
values and activities measured now include  
 
 Active/Inactive membership in seven types of voluntary organizations 
 Attitudes on gender issues 
 Basic attitudes on the market economy, on inequality and on wealth 
 Confidence in key national and international institutions (nine indicators) 
 Eleven indicators of the values which are important in the education of 
a child 
 Feeling of happiness 
 Indentification with democracy (several indicators) 
 Indicators of positions on environmental protection 
 Indicators of trust 
 Indicators of work ethics 
 Nine indicators of what is justifiable and what is not in a society, 
including the shadow economy 
 Seven indicators measuring the scales proposed by Shalom Schwartz 
 Several indicators of religiosity 
 Three indicators of xenophobia and racism 
 What democracy should be all about (seven indicators) 
 
The IBM-SPSS version of the World Values Survey data were downloaded from 
the official website of the research project: 
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSOnline.jsp. The countries and territories 
originally entered into the final analysis were: Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, 
Australia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belarus, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Cyprus, 
Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Germany, Ghana, Hong Kong (China), India, Iraq, 
Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine 
(Occupied Territories), 
12
 Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Russia, 
Rwanda, Singapore, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, 
Taiwan (China), Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, 
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 http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/ 
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12
 The World Values Survey data list the Occupied Palestinian territories (Gaza and the 
Westbank) as “Palestine”.  
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United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. We worked with 
listwise deletion of missing values. 
 
Our used statistical program was the IBM-SPSS XXII. All our used 
algorithms are fully available to the international public (IBM, 2011). As to the 
analysis of principal components and factor analysis, we generally refer our 
readers to Blalock, 1972; Dziuban and Shirkey, 1974; Harman, 1976, and 
Rummel, 1970. The choice of the factor analytical method used to reduce the 
number of variables of the World Values Survey to its underlying dimensions is 
not just a matter for the specialist but it also has many different practical 
consequences. Inglehart relied on standard principal components, which is 
basically a statistical methodology already developed before the Second World 
War. We think that the time has come to use more modern techniques which 
properly allow for stronger relations between the “factors” which are underlying 
the correlations between the variables. We think that promax factor analysis is 
the ideal analytical technique, and we use it throughout this article. 
13
  
 
Factor analysis also allows the researcher to construct combined indices, in our 
case a combined global value development index (trust in the state of law; no 
shadow economy and violence; post material activism; support for democracy; 
non-violent society; no xenophobia and racism; trust in transnational capital and 
Universities; support for the market economy, described in the works of Hayek 
and Weber; supporting gender justice; not staying away from environmental 
activism; caring for democracy; supporting the army and sports (weighted by the 
Eigenvalues of the Promax factor analytical model)).  
 
 
3. Results  
 
 
In all brevity, we would like to present now the results of our research endeavor. 
Interested readers are being referred to our website at 
https://uibk.academia.edu/ArnoTausch/Documentation-for-books-and-articles 
where they will find not only the factor loadings of the promax factors, but also 
the full correlation matrix between the factors and also a second order factor 
analysis, based on the factor scores between the 22 oblique factors, which again 
corresponds the main findings of this analysis. The presentation of all these new 
                                                 
13
 The author is indebted on this point to his colleague Prof. Almas Heshmati; see also 
Tausch, Heshmati and Karoui, 2014. Principal Component analysis was originally developed 
by Pearson (1901) and further improved by Hotelling (1933). As to the literature on factor 
analysis, see, among others Agénor, 2003; Andersen and Herbertsson, 2003; DeVellis, 2003; 
Dien et al., 2005; Finch, 2006; Hambleton et al., 1991; Heshmati and Oh, 2007; Heshmati et 
al., 2008; Heshmati, 2006a; Kang, 2002; Kieffer, 1998; McDonald, 1997; McLeod et al., 
2001. Promax factor analysis emerges as the most suitable method. 
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materials in this article, all substantially qualifying hitherto established World 
Values Survey research, would by far beyond any word limit for scientific 
journals nowadays, including the present one. 
 
In our re-analysis of the latest World Values Survey data, we show that the 
contemporary landscape of global values is indeed very different from the logic, 
described by Inglehart and his so-called self-expression values, associated by 
Inglehart with high levels of subjective well-being, good health, and high 
interpersonal trust, as well as tolerance of outgroups, support for gender 
equality, postmaterialist values, and environmental activism.  
 
We show by contrast that a very large array of negative phenomena, which 
cannot be overlooked anymore by contemporary social science, are clearly 
associated with the loss of religion. This holds for the majority of nations around 
the world, irrespective of the predominant religious denominations. Negative 
phenomena are on the rise especially in Western countries and in the 
former communist countries of Eastern Europe, where they spread most 
rapidly, and where they endanger, in the end, the very existence of the 
Open Society, such as the growth of distrust in the state of law; the shadow 
economy and violence; the distance to altruistic values; the growing fatigue 
of democracy, the lack of entrepreneurial spirit, the careless rejecting of 
work and global citizenship, and the dislike of sports and also the armed 
forces which are there to protect our societies against external threats. Our 
empirical analysis shows that while contemporary parents in the early 21
st
 
Century hold dear such educational values as independence and imagination, 
ecological responsibility and acceptancy of societal rules are on the retreat 
as the loss of religion progresses. 
 
In the tradition of Hayek and Barley, 1988 and Hayek, 1960, one finds evidence 
in our results that the values of hard work which brings success, competition, 
and private ownership of business (Appendix Map 15) today are most present 
in the following ten nations: Yemen, Uzbekistan, Libya, Tunisia, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Iraq, United States, Romania, Mexico, and Rwanda. The most anti-
market attitudes can be found today not only in some former communist nations, 
but also in core countries of the European Union, like the Netherlands. The ten 
nations, whose populations most profoundly reject the market as understood by 
Hayek, nowadays are: Azerbaijan, Poland, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Uruguay, 
Russia, Netherlands, Estonia, Singapore, and Chile. 
 
We should emphasize at this point that there is nothing arbitrary in our results 
based on the investigation of the relationships between the 78 variables. Factor 
analysis does nothing but to bring the structure, which is underlying the 
correlation matrix between the variables, to the surface. There were twenty-
 14 
two promax factors, whose statistical benchmark, the so-called Eigenvalue, was 
above 1, as required by the statistical analysis textbooks. 
 
 
Table 1: The factors of the model 
 
 
 Eigenvalue % of total 
variance 
explained 
Cumulated 
percentage of 
total variance 
explained 
no trust in the state of law 4,729 6,063 6,063 
shadow economy and violence 4,652 5,964 12,026 
post material activism 3,761 4,822 16,849 
secularism 3,289 4,217 21,065 
distance to altruistic values & G'd 2,656 3,405 24,470 
social democratic orientation 2,147 2,753 27,222 
support for democracy 2,034 2,607 29,830 
the violent society 1,898 2,433 32,263 
xenophobia and racism 1,612 2,067 34,329 
happiness and economic well-being 1,573 2,016 36,345 
lack of entrepreneurial spirit 1,444 1,851 38,197 
older generation with low education and 
high fertility 
1,316 1,687 39,884 
distrust in transnational capital and 
Universities 
1,227 1,573 41,456 
anti-Hayek/anti-Max Weber 1,219 1,563 43,020 
rejecting work, global citizenship; but 
social trust 
1,193 1,530 44,550 
supporting gender justice 1,163 1,491 46,041 
educational value: independence not 
obedience 
1,113 1,427 47,468 
staying away from environmental activism 1,096 1,406 48,873 
„fatigue of democracy“ 1,086 1,392 50,266 
egoism of the rich 1,054 1,351 51,617 
imagination versus ecological 
responsibility 
1,035 1,327 52,944 
Hating the Army and sports 1,013 1,299 54,242 
 
 
Following the conventions of factor analysis, we performed the so-called scree-
test in Graph 2. That is to say, the factors mentioned by the size of their 
Eigenvalues are on the x-axis, while the Eigenvalues are on the y-axis. Popularly 
formulated, the scree test looks at the shape of the line of the Eigenvalues. There 
should be a discernable upward bounce in the Eigenvalues to make those on the 
left hand of the Graph relevant beyond doubt. While the Eigenvalues for factors 
12 – 22 correspond to a rather unspectacular straight line starting from factor 22 
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on the right to factor 12 on the left, whose Eigenvalue is just above 1.0, the 
Eigenvalues for factors 1-5 are really way above all trends, and the Eigenvalues 
for factors 6-8 are still relatively markedly above the linear trend from factor 12 
to factor 22. Factors 9 to 11 are still above the trend line, although the visual 
diagnosis leaves other interpretations open as well. 
 
Thus the factors  
 
 no trust in the state of law 
 shadow economy and violence 
 post material activism 
 secularism 
 distance to altruistic values & G'd 
 
must be considered under any circumstances as the main factors of our model. 
Together, they already explain 24.47% of the total variance of the model, based 
on the 41178 global representative citizens and 78 variables from 45 countries. 
The following factors still achieved some salience 
 
 social democratic orientation 
 support for democracy 
 the violent society 
 
while  
 
 xenophobia and racism 
 happiness and economic well-being 
 lack of entrepreneurial spirit 
 
must be considered as “borderline cases” of the scree test.  
 
The other factors, that is to say: 
 
 older generation with low education and high fertility 
 distrust in transnational capital and Universities 
 anti-Hayek/anti-Max Weber 
 rejecting work, global citizenship; but social trust  
 supporting gender justice 
 educational value: independence not obedience 
 staying away from environmental activism 
 „fatigue of democracy“ 
 egoism of the rich 
 imagination versus ecological responsibility 
 Hating the Army and sports 
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should be interpreted with caution: while their Eigenvalue is still above 1.0, their 
Eigenvalues correspond rather to a straight line starting from factor 22. 
 
 
Graph 2: The scree-test for the factor analytical model 
 
 
 
 
 
In the following, we will make some comments on the promax rotated factors, 
and refer our readers also to the following choropleth maps (Appendix Map 2 to 
Appendix Map 23), which contain a detailed description of the most important 
factor loadings as well as the countries corresponding most and corresponding 
least to these factors: 
 
 
no trust in the state of law: combines low 
trust in the state apparatus, especially the 
organs of state security with distrust in the 
press, the universities, the banks and 
transnational corporations. Worst 
performers are located in Eastern Europe 
and Latin America; while some Muslim 
societies and China are outstanding 
performers on this scale. 
 
shadow economy and violence: 
acceptancy of cheating on taxes, stealing 
property, taking bribes, avoiding fares on 
public transport, cheating on government 
social benefits, combined with acceptancy 
of violence against other people and 
violence against women. Worst 
performers: Philippines, Algeria, Lebanon, 
Mexico, Russia, best performers: 
Azerbaijan, Trinidad and Tobago, Ghana, 
Japan and Turkey. These two factors 
combined already explain 12,026% of total 
variance, and the scree-plot suggests that in 
statistical terms, they are the most reliable 
measurement scales in our present work. 
Both factors are at the center of economic 
theory formation and were hitherto 
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neglected by empirical sociological value 
research. 
 
post material activism: volunteer 
activities for humanitarian and ecological 
organizations, labor unions, Church 
organizations and other volunteer 
activities. Worst performers: Tunisia, 
Azerbaijan, Armenia, Turkey; best 
performers: Taiwan (China), Sweden, 
Rwanda, Australia, Nigeria and the 
Philippines. This “Etzioni” factor of an 
active society also could present many 
perspectives in the context of future 
democratic stability. 
 
secularism: no importance assigned to G’d 
in one’s life and to religious education; no 
attendance of religious services, no activity 
in Church organizations, rejection of 
tradition, acceptancy of divorce, rejection 
of the interpretation of laws by religious 
authorities. Lowest values in Sub-Saharan 
African developing countries, highest 
occurrence in Sweden, China, the 
Netherlands, Estonia, Slovenia, Japan and 
Australia. 
 
distance to altruistic values & G'd: 
combines the Shalom Schwartz scale about 
not looking after the environment with the 
Schwartz scale of not accepting tradition, 
proper behavior, and altruism. The factor is 
combined with a low importance assigned 
to God in one’s life. Least occurring in 
some Eastern European and former Soviet 
countries, Columbia and some Arab 
countries, highest occurrence in Japan, the 
Netherlands, Rwanda and South Korea 
 
social democratic orientation: This 
orientation combines demands for 
redistribution by the state in favor of the 
poor and unemployed with a strong belief 
in civil rights, in free elections, and – 
surprisingly enough – with the 
interpretation of laws by the religious 
authorities. This “socialism” of the 21st 
Century, which in several countries also 
has a religious aspect, is weakest in the 
United States, Trinidad and Tobago, Japan, 
and Sweden, and is strongest in Pakistan, 
Turkey, Uzbekistan, the Ukraine and 
China. 
 
support for democracy: this factor 
combines support for democracy on 
various scales with a rejection of the 
interpretation of laws by the religious 
authorities and support for gender justice 
(University equally important for a boy or 
for a girl). Support for secular democracy 
and supporting gender justice is weakest in 
Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, the Philippines, and 
Azerbaijan, and is strongest in Sweden, the 
Netherlands, Australia, Cyprus, Japan and 
the United States. 
 
the violent society: This factor combines 
the acceptancy of domestic violence 
against women and children with the 
acceptancy of violence against other 
people, acceptancy of taking bribes, 
stealing property and cheating on taxes. 
The worst performers on this scale are 
Rwanda, the Philippines, Zimbabwe, 
Nigeria, and Singapore, while Chile, 
Romania, Japan, South Korea and Poland 
are the best performers. 
 
 
In the following, we can only present – where necessary – some general further 
comments on the remaining factor of lesser statistical importance: 
 
 xenophobia and racism 
 happiness and economic well-being 
 lack of entrepreneurial spirit 
 older generation with low education and high fertility 
 distrust in transnational capital and Universities 
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 anti-Hayek/anti-Max Weber 
 rejecting work, global citizenship; but social trust 
 supporting gender justice 
 educational value independence not obedience 
 staying away from environmental activism 
 „fatigue of democracy“ 
 egoism of the rich 
 imagination versus ecological responsibility 
 hating the Army and sports 
 
From the viewpoint of previous research on the subject, the following factors 
deserve some further verbal comments, while all the necessary basic information 
about our research results is presented in Appendix Maps 2-23 and in the 
Appendix, which we made electronically freely available at 
https://uibk.academia.edu/ArnoTausch/Documentation-for-books-and-articles  
 
 
 
The rejection of the Schwartz scales “get 
rich”, “adventure and risk”, and “new 
ideas” combines with a very negative 
attitude towards elderly people, which are 
seen as a burden on society, and with a 
rejection of global citizenship. This 
attitude, which we call “lack of 
entrepreneurial spirit” is especially to be 
found in former communist countries – 
especially in the former USSR – and in 
Japan and Taiwan, while this attitude is 
least to be found in four countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa.  
 
Contemporary strong anti-globalization 
attitudes, directed against major companies 
and banks, combine with a negative 
attitude against (global) Universities, the 
national civil service and the national 
press. This factor of distrust in 
transnational capital and the 
Universities is strongest in the five 
majority Muslim countries Jordan, Tunisia, 
Yemen, the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories and Iraq, while three Sub-
Saharan African developing countries, 
Taiwan and Estonia are the least anti-
globalization countries in the WVS 
sample. 
 
Appendix Map 14 shows the factor “anti-
Hayek/anti-Max Weber”, combining the 
attitude that hard work does NOT bring 
success, with the rejection of competition 
and the longing for state ownership of 
enterprises. This factor is especially 
present in some former communist 
countries, while some majority Muslim 
countries (Yemen, Uzbekistan, Libya, and 
Tunisia) and the Caribbean nation of 
Trinidad and Tobago best correspond to 
the lessons of Hayek and Weber. 
 
Rejecting work, global citizenship; but a 
higher social trust is a factor least 
frequently to be encountered in several 
poor countries, among them Latin 
America, while it is especially prominent 
in the post-industrial societies of the 
Netherlands, the United States, Sweden, 
Australia, Japan and interestingly also in 
Belarus. It combines the rejection of work, 
global citizenship, and the importance of 
G’d for one’s life with a higher degree of 
social trust and an acceptancy of divorce. It 
is a factor typical for the secular milieu in 
highly developed countries. 
 
There is a certain polarization in the global 
educational values between a dimension, 
emphasizing independence and 
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responsibility, and a dimension 
emphasizing obedience and unselfishness. 
The independence, not obedience 
syndrome is strongest in highly 
industrialized capitalist and former 
communist countries, and weakest in 
African and Latin American developing 
countries.  
 
Staying away from environmental 
activism is weakest in Sweden, the 
Netherlands and Australia, and strongest in 
Muslim and non-Muslim developing 
countries.  
 
Our analysis also clearly shows the 
existence of the phenomenon of the 
“fatigue of democracy” in several 
advanced western nations and also in 
developing countries in Latin America 
with a long tradition of democracy. In the 
countries of the former USSR, this 
phenomenon is still least present. It 
combines a rejection of the importance of 
democracy with the absence of activities in 
sports organizations, a low attendance of 
religious services or no attendance at all, 
and also these strata refrain from donating 
money to ecological organizations.  
 
The “egoism of the rich” combines 
material satisfaction with a low trust of 
other people and a positive attitude 
towards divorce. While it is least present in 
some developed old and new democracies, 
it is very common especially in five 
majority Muslim countries – Yemen, 
Pakistan, Libya, Jordan, and Malaysia. The 
relationship of this variable with indicators 
of societal inequality would have to be 
investigated in further research. 
 
Above, we have stated that there is a 
certain polarization in the global 
educational values between a dimension, 
emphasizing independence and 
responsibility, and a dimension 
emphasizing obedience and unselfishness. 
The second global “clash” between 
competing syndromes of education 
concerns the dimension of imagination 
versus ecological responsibility. It is very 
typical for the secular milieus in several 
majority Muslim developing countries like 
Pakistan, Turkey, Algeria, Lebanon, and 
also Nigeria and Rwanda, while it is least 
present in the Netherlands, in Yemen, in 
Poland and in Chile. Why there are such 
large differences between the majority 
Muslim countries Pakistan, Turkey, 
Algeria et cetera on the one hand and 
Yemen on the other hand would have to be 
investigated in further research.  
 
Finally, the last factor to be presented is 
“hating the Army and sports”, which is 
very typical for some non-Russian former 
parts of the USSR and also Zimbabwe, 
while it is least present in Sweden, Poland, 
and China, all countries, where sports and 
the armed forces of the country both are 
very popular.
 
 
 
Table 2 shows the main contradictions between secularism, the distance to 
altruistic values and to G’d and values necessary for an Open Society in the 21st 
Century. Table 2 also supports the argument, forwarded in Graph 1. Enlightened 
religion positively contributes to the six factors as described by our Graph. The 
empirical evidence on the ‘‘transformative potential’’ of religions shows that 
religions have the ‘‘capacity to legitimize, in religious or ideological terms, the 
development of new motivations, activities, and institutions which were not 
encompassed by their original impulses and views”, as was predicted by 
Eisenstadt, 1968. 
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Table 2: the main correlations between the promax factors, contradicting 
the hitherto existing secularist consensus in sociology 
 
 
 secularism distance to 
altruistic values 
& G'd 
no trust in the state of law 0,105 0,120 
shadow economy and violence 0,038 0,151 
lack of entrepreneurial spirit 0,212 -0,077 
anti-Hayek/anti-Max Weber 0,096 0,149 
rejecting work, global citizenship; but social trust 0,312 0,218 
„fatigue of democracy“ 0,105 -0,018 
 
 
We also present a Global Value Development Index. According to the standard 
statistical analysis textbook recommendations, we multiplied the original factor 
scores by the Eigenvalues. For factors, which originally present a socially 
negative phenomenon, like “no trust in the state of law”, we also multiplied the 
factor scores by the number -1. So the final weights applied to our original 
factors scores to arrive at the results in Table 3 were: 
 
no trust in the state of law      -4,729 
shadow economy and violence     -4,652 
postmaterial activism       +3,761 
support for democracy      +2,034 
the violent society       -1,898 
xenophobia and racism      -1,612 
distrust in transnational capital and Universities   -1,227 
anti-Hayek/anti-Max Weber      -1,219 
supporting gender justice      +1,163 
staying away from environmental activism    -1,096 
„fatigue of democracy“      -1,086 
Hating the Army and sports      -1,013 
 
Graph 3 shows the percentages which each factor contributes to the final Global 
Value Development Index. 
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Graph 3: The weights of the different components in the Global Value 
Development Index 
 
 
 
 
 
If we assume that the World Values Survey data are correct and that trust in the 
state of law; no shadow economy and violence; post material activism; support 
for democracy; non-violent society; no xenophobia and racism; trust in 
transnational capital and Universities; Hayek/Max Weber; supporting gender 
justice; not staying away from environmental activism; no democracy fatigue; 
and supporting the Army and sports are the twelve factors best representing the 
social values necessary for an Open Society then we must recognize that today 
Sweden; Uzbekistan; Australia; Netherlands; Ghana; Taiwan; Trinidad and 
Tobago; Rwanda; United States; and China are the societies, whose populations 
most support these social values. On the other hand, it also emerges from the 
World Values Survey data that the populations in Lebanon; Algeria; Russia; 
Yemen; Ukraine; Iraq; Peru; Libya; Tunisia; and the Philippines least support 
these twelve core social values, deemed necessary for the good functioning of an 
Open Society in the long run. 
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Table 3: Global Value Development Index 
 
Country trust in 
the 
state of 
law 
no 
shadow 
econom
y and 
violence 
post 
materia
l 
activis
m 
support 
for 
democr
acy 
non-
violent 
society 
no 
xenoph
obia 
and 
racism 
trust in 
transna
tional 
capital 
and 
Univers
ities 
Hayek/
Max 
Weber 
support
ing 
gender 
justice 
not 
staying 
away 
from 
environ
mental 
activis
m 
caring 
for 
democr
acy 
Support
ing the 
Army 
and 
sports 
Overall 
Value 
Develop
ment 
Index 
Sweden -0,078 -0,048 2,760 2,941 0,538 0,927 0,400 -0,160 0,729 0,809 -1,363 0,517 7,972 
Uzbekistan 7,932 0,242 -1,339 -0,354 -0,059 0,358 0,250 0,651 -0,336 0,021 0,957 -0,783 7,540 
Australia -0,437 0,734 2,528 1,995 0,627 0,805 0,003 0,198 0,712 0,569 -0,876 -0,078 6,780 
Netherlands -1,556 1,824 1,358 2,024 0,543 0,590 0,035 -0,434 0,602 0,610 -0,688 0,398 5,306 
Ghana 1,309 2,266 0,601 0,188 -0,616 0,132 1,024 0,298 0,041 -0,419 0,393 -0,128 5,089 
Taiwan -1,559 0,516 3,672 0,936 -0,337 0,574 0,732 0,216 0,071 0,005 -0,429 0,310 4,707 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
-2,434 2,467 1,031 0,764 -0,124 0,989 0,284 0,574 0,554 0,164 -0,042 0,300 4,527 
Rwanda 1,542 1,758 2,558 -0,920 -2,303 0,916 -0,104 0,300 0,029 -0,017 0,413 0,155 4,327 
United States -0,775 0,308 1,366 1,144 0,450 0,705 -0,189 0,349 0,573 0,312 -0,165 -0,028 4,050 
China 3,743 -0,050 -1,211 -0,262 -0,502 0,627 0,273 0,201 -0,025 -0,221 0,432 0,422 3,427 
Japan 0,100 2,046 -0,425 1,196 0,878 -0,341 0,109 -0,045 0,088 0,233 -0,641 -0,266 2,932 
Cyprus -0,116 1,224 -0,180 1,265 0,746 -0,369 -0,134 -0,184 0,364 0,279 -0,432 -0,218 2,245 
Estonia -0,109 -0,128 -0,684 0,925 0,733 -0,454 0,680 -0,342 0,540 -0,104 0,010 0,053 1,120 
Zimbabwe -0,051 0,094 0,588 0,558 -1,246 0,666 0,695 0,189 0,110 -0,427 0,242 -0,341 1,077 
Turkey 2,059 2,017 -2,014 -0,242 0,814 -0,666 -0,544 -0,192 -0,294 -0,195 0,055 0,023 0,821 
Nigeria -0,570 0,541 2,170 -0,616 -1,039 -0,022 0,644 -0,220 -0,340 0,052 0,221 -0,134 0,687 
Chile -1,514 -0,036 0,050 0,698 1,039 0,737 -0,320 -0,310 0,514 0,484 -0,641 -0,099 0,602 
Colombia -1,800 0,019 0,877 -0,329 0,496 0,943 0,189 -0,106 0,435 0,494 -0,947 0,234 0,505 
Uruguay -1,433 1,179 -0,743 0,803 0,489 0,966 0,071 -0,545 0,431 0,159 -1,205 0,020 0,192 
 23 
Malaysia 3,176 -1,027 -0,705 -0,578 -0,169 -1,061 0,131 0,150 -0,254 0,004 -0,004 0,297 -0,040 
Romania -2,423 1,516 -1,298 0,805 0,915 -0,136 -0,199 0,310 0,022 0,161 0,260 0,015 -0,052 
Singapore 2,378 -1,152 -0,205 -0,640 -1,037 0,013 0,428 -0,313 0,173 0,097 0,109 0,097 -0,052 
Korea, South -1,199 0,419 -0,096 -0,061 0,849 -0,945 0,533 -0,306 0,156 0,085 0,277 -0,121 -0,409 
Poland -2,431 0,087 -0,558 0,657 0,847 0,667 0,161 -0,675 0,105 -0,104 -0,620 0,505 -1,359 
Kyrgyzstan 0,834 -1,033 0,419 -1,378 0,336 -0,488 -0,253 0,001 -0,222 0,036 0,745 -0,361 -1,364 
Slovenia -4,346 0,392 0,673 0,672 0,468 0,489 0,078 -0,147 0,707 0,246 -0,668 0,046 -1,390 
Jordan 3,224 1,769 -1,744 -0,882 0,321 -0,728 -1,242 0,060 -1,043 -0,595 -0,565 -0,079 -1,504 
Kazakhstan 0,667 -1,010 -1,264 0,005 -0,002 0,133 -0,136 -0,604 -0,002 -0,293 0,750 -0,120 -1,876 
Mexico -2,475 -2,598 1,196 -0,370 0,638 0,534 0,004 0,304 0,488 0,512 -0,497 0,232 -2,032 
Belarus -0,458 -1,315 -0,890 -0,076 0,477 -0,330 0,163 -0,208 0,002 -0,331 0,843 0,082 -2,041 
Pakistan -0,010 1,494 -1,988 -1,318 0,598 0,062 -0,360 0,273 -1,041 0,036 0,059 -0,062 -2,257 
Azerbaijan 1,931 2,533 -2,175 -1,023 0,373 -1,314 -0,397 -0,749 -0,929 -0,659 0,563 -0,442 -2,288 
Ecuador -0,759 -0,311 -1,289 -0,500 0,711 -0,607 -0,378 0,201 0,377 0,083 -0,238 0,380 -2,330 
Armenia -1,124 1,167 -2,136 0,125 0,628 -0,704 -0,625 0,146 -0,491 -0,213 0,550 -0,441 -3,118 
Philippines 2,131 -5,169 2,016 -1,229 -1,363 0,293 0,109 0,024 -0,322 0,196 0,187 -0,015 -3,142 
Tunisia -0,581 1,348 -2,255 0,006 0,020 -0,048 -1,050 0,592 -0,823 -0,676 0,004 -0,156 -3,619 
Libya 0,049 0,720 -0,217 -0,590 -0,292 -1,933 -0,427 0,609 -0,806 -0,294 -0,487 0,000 -3,668 
Peru -3,908 -0,826 -0,587 0,016 0,509 0,573 -0,220 0,172 0,315 0,516 -0,630 0,069 -4,001 
Iraq 0,875 -0,199 -1,964 -0,777 -0,683 -0,487 -0,732 0,532 -0,821 -0,486 -0,104 0,031 -4,815 
Ukraine -2,915 -0,872 -1,546 0,051 0,426 0,089 -0,244 -0,567 0,122 -0,229 0,697 -0,036 -5,024 
Yemen -2,379 1,428 -1,587 -0,215 -0,675 -0,450 -1,014 1,213 -0,900 -0,413 -0,313 0,112 -5,193 
Russia -1,830 -2,266 -1,451 -0,293 0,244 -0,228 -0,342 -0,545 0,129 -0,175 0,616 -0,132 -6,273 
Algeria 0,487 -3,385 -1,903 -0,224 -0,688 -0,585 -0,461 -0,040 -0,635 -0,396 -0,089 -0,011 -7,930 
Lebanon -2,377 -2,635 -0,300 -0,882 -0,479 -1,148 -0,560 -0,272 -0,288 0,081 -0,152 -0,201 -9,213 
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Map 1: Overall Value Development Index 
 
-9,21
-7,07
-4,92
-2,77
-0,62
1,53
3,68
5,83
7,97
10,12
source: our ow n calculations and http://w w w .clearlyandsimply.com/clearly_and_simply/2009/06/choropleth-maps-w ith-excel.html  
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For many decades, comparing religions for their doctrinal aspects has been the 
domain of the comparative study of religions, and several outstanding works 
were published in the literature which investigated the “who” said “what” “to 
whom” and “when” (Lasswell, 1948) in these major denominations along their 
historical trajectory (Bowker, 2000; Küng, 1997, 2002; Lenoir and Tardan-
Masquelier, 1997). Social scientists however are primarily interested in the 
“what effects” and “why” of these religious activities ever since the beginnings 
of the sociology of religion (Durkheim, 1965/1915; Morel, 1972, 1977, 1986, 
1997, 1998, 2003).  
 
Valuable, as interfaith research and dialogue, comparisons and a mutual better 
understanding between the different global denominations may be, such 
activities as yet do not tell us which values, say, guide inhabitants in the rural 
regions of the Philippines in comparison to the people in Bihar, India, or in the 
Punjab in Pakistan just across the Indian border, or for that matter in the 
Nigerian city of Lagos or in Brooklyn, New York or in Amsterdam in the 
Netherlands. For that reason, it’s a welcome development that nowadays 
empirically oriented political scientists and sociologists have begun to publish 
comparative studies on their own on comparing religions (Juergensmeyer et al., 
2013; Röhrich, 2004, 2010). This research effort, just to mention a few, 
produced already important comparative studies on the relationship of the 
globalized denominations to the state apparatus in 175 countries (Fox, 2000), or 
on the relationship of religions to violence and terrorism (Juergensmeyer, 2000, 
2011). Even more, the use of massive comparative evidence based on global 
opinion surveys to compare the actual different cultural systems of the world 
“on the ground”, is relatively new, and outstanding attempts to arrive at such 
empirically well-founded comparisons already include Barro, 2004; Guio et al., 
2003; and Inglehart and Norris, 2003.  
 
In the following, we apply the logic of our new “Overall Value Development 
Index” to the data contained in the World Values Survey about the major global 
religious denominations. Such an attempt is but a continuation of the path-
breaking analysis by Guio et al. Our comparisons show again the importance of 
the factor of the Enlightenment for the different denominations to come to terms 
with the realities of the 21
st
 Century (starting with Montesquieu, 1989, we refer 
here to Eisenstadt, 1968; Feiner and Naor, 2011; Lawson, 2005; Lehner and 
O’Neill Printy, 2010; Sacks, 1998, 2005). For reasons of space we can only 
mention some preliminary results and must leave other aspects for further 
research. In that context, we could also mention the hypothesis by Lenoir, who 
maintained that inequality, individual freedom, emancipation of women, social 
justice, the separation of powers, non-violence and pardoning of sins, and love 
of your neighbor as the seven major points of the message of Jesus of Nazareth 
only came to blossom in the movement of the Enlightenment (Lenoir, 2008).  
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For each denomination (and for the people without any denomination), we 
empirically distinguish between those individuals who say that G’d has a great 
importance in their lives 
14
 and the respective entire population. Our results by 
and large confirm the findings, reported by Porta et al., 1996 about the poor 
performance of what he terms to be hierarchical global religions in contrast 
to the other denominations (Fukuyama, 1995 and Putnam, 1993). Table 4 also 
confirms the pessimism regarding Confucianism, which already features 
prominently in Huntington, 1996, and which on all accounts has the poorest 
performance of all the major denominations on our combined indicator. This 
performance, we have to add, does not necessarily reflect a doctrinal or 
sociological weakness of the community of Confucian believers per se, but does 
reflect the realities of contemporary China which still is a one-party communist 
state (McGregor, 2010).  
 
 
Table 4: The paths of Enlightenment: Global Value Development Index for 
the different global denominations (religiously active population and total 
population) 
 
 
 Overall Value 
Development 
Index 
Jewish global total population in the WVS sample 4,085 
Jewish global population in the WVS sample saying G’d important/very 
important 
3,620 
Protestant global population in the WVS sample saying G’d 
important/very important 
3,375 
Protestant global total population in the WVS sample 3,193 
Hindu global population in the WVS sample saying G’d important/very 
important 
3,159 
Hindu global total population in the WVS sample 2,793 
Buddhist global population in the WVS sample saying G’d 
important/very important 
1,566 
Taoist global population in the WVS sample saying G’d important/very 
important 
1,525 
Buddhist global total population in the WVS sample 1,233 
Taoist global total population in the WVS sample 0,601 
No religious denomination global total population in the WVS sample 0,336 
Roman Catholic global population in the WVS sample saying G’d 
important/very important 
0,295 
                                                 
14
 The WVS item about the importance of G’d is a 10-point scale. People choosing a value of 
7 or more on the scale were classified as the population with stronger religious feelings. We 
are aware of the fact that such a distinction might be arbitrary. It should be emphasized 
however that also people NOT belonging formally to any religious denomination may be 
religious persons, and indeed they often are! 
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Roman Catholic global total population in the WVS sample 0,036 
Muslim global population in the WVS sample saying G’d 
important/very important 
-0,974 
Muslim global total population in the WVS sample -1,125 
No religious denomination global population in the WVS sample saying 
G’d important/very important 
-1,140 
Orthodox global population in the WVS sample saying G’d 
important/very important 
-1,192 
Orthodox global total population in the WVS sample -1,729 
Confucian global total population in the WVS sample -6,555 
Confucian global population in the WVS sample saying G’d 
important/very important 
-7,413 
 
 
On this account, the 5775 year old religion of Judaism (Sacks, 1998, 2003, 2005, 
2014) emerges as the role model for other religions how to combine religion and 
the traditions of the Enlightenment (Feiner and Naor, 2011; see also Cardinal A. 
Bea, 1966). It also should be noted that Eisenstadt’s hypothesis about the 
transformative potential defined as the capacity to legitimize, in religious or 
ideological terms, the development of new motivations, activities, and 
institutions which were not encompassed by their original impulses and views is 
fully vindicated for the case of global Judaism and global Protestantism. 
Interestingly enough, also Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism and Roman 
Catholicism are assigned a positive value on the indicator. It has to be noted as 
well that religiously committed Protestants and Roman Catholics rank better on 
our scale than does the overall global Protestant and Roman Catholic population, 
indicating how much already traditions of the Enlightenment took hold of the 
two major Western Christian denominations.  
 
 
4. Conclusions and prospects 
 
 
In our essay, we evaluated the latest wave of World Values Survey data. Our 
article is based on a standard IBM-SPSS XXII analysis of the data. Very large 
arrays of negative phenomena, which cannot be overlooked anymore by 
contemporary social science, are clearly associated with the loss of religion. 
This holds for the majority of nations around the world, irrespective of the 
predominant religious denominations. Negative phenomena are on the rise 
especially in Western countries and in the former communist countries of 
Eastern Europe, where they spread most rapidly, and where they endanger, in 
the end, the very existence of the Open Society. Our results, based on the factor 
analysis of the opinions of 41178 global representative citizens from 45 
countries, for whom data for all our 78 variables were available, also show the 
following to hold: 
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Inglehart’s optimism completely 
vindicated 
 
 - 
 
Inglehart’s optimism mostly vindicated 
(minor development crises only at very 
early stages of secularization) 
 
 Support for democracy 
 
Inglehart’s optimism vindicated, but 
reversals at highest stages of 
secularization: 
 
 Violent society 
 
Severe development crises at middle 
stages of secularization 
 
 No trust in the state of law 
 Shadow economy and violence 
 Post-material activism 
 Xenophobia and racism 
 Distrust in transnational capital and 
Universities 
 Fatigue of democracy 
 
Outright secularization pessimism 
vindicated for most stages of the 
secularization process and positive turns 
only at very high stages of secularization 
 
 Lack of entrepreneurial spirit 
 
Outright secularization pessimism 
vindicated 
 
 Distance to altruistic values 
 Anti-Hayek/anti-Max Weber 
 
 
 
Graph 4 now shows the diagrams of the mean country factor scores (y-axis) as 
predicted by secularism and secularism squared (secularism: x- axis). Graph 3, 
so to speak, presents the new laws of global values and development, as they 
emerge from this article. 
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Graph 4: The thorny paths of secularization. Mean country factor scores 
(y-axis) as predicted by secularism and secularism squared (secularism: x- 
axis) 
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An analysis of the emerging trends regarding the relationship of value structures 
to economic convergence also seems to suggest that in contrast to Inglehart’s 
secularist interpretation, value change is becoming destructive indeed and 
undermines the very basis of economic growth in the West. 
15
 Trust and work 
ethics all have an influence on the economic growth rate of today: no trust in the 
state of law, distrust in transnational capital and Universities, and lack of 
entrepreneurial spirit are among the major growth bottlenecks, while our Value 
Development Index is positively related to the economic convergence process 
between the nations since the global economic crisis of 2007/2008. International 
economic data (see: https://uibk.academia.edu/ArnoTausch/Documentation-for-
books-and-articles) also suggest that the shifting of global economic weights 
away from Europe and benefitting the world of Islam and the world of 
immigration is absolutely correct (see Table 4 and Table 5).  
                                                 
15
 Poorer nations grow faster than richer countries. The well-known facts of economic 
convergence, analyzed by Barro, suggest to test the effects of social values on economic 
growth by correlating social values with economic convergence, measured here by the 
residuals from the non-linear function of average economic growth rates, predicted by the 
natural logarithm of GDP per capita and GDP per capita square in the initial phase of the 
growth process. Other procedures would bias the results in favor of poorer nations, whose 
economic growth “automatically” tends to be higher; see also Barro, 1991, 1998, 2012; Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin, 1991.  
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Table 4: the bi-variate correlations of economic convergence, 2008-2013 
with value patterns 
 
 
 Pearson 
correlation with 
convergence 
R^2 
no trust in the state of law -0,511 26,156 
distrust in transnational capital and 
Universities 
-0,299 8,923 
lack of entrepreneurial spirit -0,256 6,539 
social democratic orientation -0,141 1,976 
careless rejecting of work, global 
citizenship, but trusting people 
-0,138 1,911 
post material activism 0,163 2,669 
happiness and economic well-being 0,224 5,019 
Value Development Index 0,251 6,321 
 
 
Table 5: the bi-variate correlations of economic convergence with global 
structure data 
 
 
 Pearson 
correlation with 
convergence 
R^2 
years of membership in EMU, 
2010 
-0,157 2,477 
social security expenditure per 
GDP average 1990s (ILO) 
-0,139 1,944 
Years of membership in the EU, 
2010 
-0,132 1,738 
Muslim population share per total 
population 
0,146 2,143 
Membership in the Islamic 
Conference 
0,157 2,461 
MNC outward investments (stock) 
per GDP 
0,183 3,349 
% world population 0,198 3,932 
Immigration - Share of population 
2005 (%) 
0,253 6,392 
Annual population growth rate, 
1975-2005 (%) 
0,310 9,620 
net international migration rate, 
2005-2010 
0,376 14,143 
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Appendix Map 1a: average economic growth rates 2008-2013  
 
-4,84
-2,74
-0,64
1,46
3,56
5,66
7,76
9,86
11,96
14,06
source: our ow n calculations and http://w w w .clearlyandsimply.com/clearly_and_simply/2009/06/choropleth-maps-w ith-excel.html  
 
 34 
Appendix Map 1b: economic convergence, 2008-2013 (residuals from the regression natural log GDP per capita and 
natural log GDP per capita^2 by around 2005 on average economic growth (GDP per capita) 2008-2013) 
 
-6,58
-4,45
-2,32
-0,19
1,94
4,08
6,21
8,34
10,47
12,60
source: our ow n calculations and http://w w w .clearlyandsimply.com/clearly_and_simply/2009/06/choropleth-maps-w ith-excel.html  
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Appendix Map 2: no trust in the state of law 
 
-1,68
-1,35
-1,03
-0,70
-0,38
-0,05
0,27
0,59
0,92
1,24
source: our ow n calculations and http://w w w .clearlyandsimply.com/clearly_and_simply/2009/06/choropleth-maps-w ith-excel.html  
 
 
no Confidence: Justice System/Courts 0,783 
no Confidence: The Police 0,762 
no Confidence: The Government 0,738 
no Confidence: The Civil Services 0,652 
no Confidence: Armed Forces 0,640 
no Confidence: The Press 0,574 
no Confidence: Banks 0,448 
no Confidence: Universities 0,426 
no Confidence: Major Companies 0,411 
Slovenia (2011) 0,919 
Peru (2012) 0,826 
Ukraine (2011) 0,616 
Mexico (2012) 0,523 
Trinidad and Tobago (2011)
 0,515 
Poland (2012) 0,514 
Malaysia (2012) -0,672 
Jordan (2014) -0,682 
China (2012) -0,792 
Uzbekistan (2011) -1,677 
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Appendix Map 3: shadow economy and violence 
 
-0,54
-0,34
-0,13
0,08
0,28
0,49
0,70
0,90
1,11
1,32
source: our ow n calculations and http://w w w .clearlyandsimply.com/clearly_and_simply/2009/06/choropleth-maps-w ith-excel.html  
 
 
Justifiable: cheating on taxes 0,777 
Justifiable: Stealing property 0,775 
Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe 0,760 
Justifiable: avoiding a fare on public transport 0,755 
Justifiable: claiming government benefits 0,711 
Justifiable: Violence against other people 0,539 
Justifiable: For a man to beat his wife 0,448 
Philippines (2012) 1,111 
Algeria (2013) 0,728 
Lebanon (2013) 0,566 
Mexico (2012) 0,558 
Russian Federaton (2011)
 0,487 
Turkey (2011) -0,434 
Japan (2010) -0,440 
Ghana (2012) -0,487 
Trinidad and Tobago (2011) -
0,530 
Azerbaijan (2011) -0,545 
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Appendix Map 4: post material activism 
 
-0,60
-0,40
-0,21
-0,01
0,19
0,39
0,58
0,78
0,98
1,17
source: our ow n calculations and http://w w w .clearlyandsimply.com/clearly_and_simply/2009/06/choropleth-maps-w ith-excel.html  
 
Active/Inactive membership of environmental organization
 0,710 
Active/Inactive membership of charitable/humanitarian organization
 0,707 
Active/Inactive membership: Consumer organization 0,686 
Active/Inactive membership of art, music, educational 0,668 
Active/Inactive membership of sport or recreation 0,606 
Active/Inactive membership of labour unions 0,580 
Active/Inactive membership of church or religious organization
 0,401 
Taiwan (2012) 0,976 
Sweden (2011) 0,734 
Rwanda (2012) 0,680 
Australia (2012) 0,672 
Nigeria (2011) 0,577 
Philippines (2012) 0,536 
Turkey (2011) -0,536 
Armenia (2011) -0,568 
Azerbaijan (2011) -0,578 
Tunisia (2013) -0,600 
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Appendix Map 5: secularism 
 
-1,25
-0,91
-0,57
-0,23
0,11
0,45
0,79
1,13
1,47
1,81
source: our ow n calculations and http://w w w .clearlyandsimply.com/clearly_and_simply/2009/06/choropleth-maps-w ith-excel.html  
 
never attend religious services 0,728 
How important is God in your life -0,699 
Important child qualities: religious faith -0,672 
Active/Inactive membership of church or religious organization -
0,538 
Justifiable: divorce 0,471 
Democracy: Religious authorities interpret the laws. -0,407 
Schwartz: tradition not important 0,318 
Sweden (2011) 1,472 
China (2012) 1,284 
Netherlands (2012) 1,262 
Estonia (2011) 1,260 
Slovenia (2011) 1,097 
Japan (2010) 1,081 
Australia (2012) 1,042 
Zimbabwe (2012) -1,059 
Ghana (2012) -1,185 
Nigeria (2011) -1,251 
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Appendix Map 6: distance to altruistic values & G'd 
 
-0,93
-0,65
-0,38
-0,11
0,16
0,43
0,70
0,97
1,24
1,51
source: our ow n calculations and http://w w w .clearlyandsimply.com/clearly_and_simply/2009/06/choropleth-maps-w ith-excel.html  
 
Schwartz: not important looking after the environment 0,731 
Schwartz: tradition not important 0,687 
Schwartz: not important always behave properly 0,676 
Schwartz: not important to do something for the good of society 0,670 
How important is God in your life -0,367 
Japan (2010) 1,241 
Netherlands (2012) 0,938 
Rwanda (2012) 0,777 
South Korea (2010) 0,687 
Yemen (2014) -0,551 
Colombia (2012) -0,552 
Cyprus (2011) -0,576 
Jordan (2014) -0,810 
Libya (2014) -0,867 
Uzbekistan (2011) -0,925 
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Appendix Map 7: social democratic orientation 
 
-0,78
-0,55
-0,32
-0,09
0,15
0,38
0,61
0,84
1,07
1,31
source: our ow n calculations and http://w w w .clearlyandsimply.com/clearly_and_simply/2009/06/choropleth-maps-w ith-excel.html  
 
 
Democracy: The state makes people's incomes equal 0,715 
Democracy: People receive state aid for unemployment. 0,674 
Democracy: Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor. 0,644 
Democracy: Civil rights protect people’s liberty against oppression.
 0,477 
Democracy: Religious authorities interpret the laws. 0,444 
Democracy: People choose their leaders in free elections. 0,372 
Democracy: Women have the same rights as men. 0,365 
Pakistan (2012) 1,075 
Turkey (2011) 0,725 
Uzbekistan (2011) 0,719 
Ukraine (2011) 0,670 
China (2012) 0,545 
Sweden (2011) -0,521 
Japan (2010) -0,557 
Trinidad and Tobago (2011) -
0,617 
Australia (2012) -0,701 
United States (2011) -0,784 
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Appendix Map 8: support for democracy 
 
-0,68
-0,41
-0,15
0,12
0,38
0,65
0,92
1,18
1,45
1,71
source: our ow n calculations and http://w w w .clearlyandsimply.com/clearly_and_simply/2009/06/choropleth-maps-w ith-excel.html  
 
Democracy: People choose their leaders in free elections. 0,628 
Importance of democracy 0,601 
Democracy: Civil rights protect people’s liberty against oppression.
 0,537 
Democracy: Women have the same rights as men. 0,531 
reject: Political system: Having a democratic political system -0,517 
Justifiable: divorce 0,395 
Democracy: Religious authorities interpret the laws. -0,363 
reject: University is more important for a boy than for a girl 0,338 
Sweden (2011) 1,446 
Netherlands (2012) 0,995 
Australia (2012) 0,981 
Cyprus (2011) 0,622 
Japan (2010) 0,588 
United States (2011) 0,562 
Azerbaijan (2011) -0,503 
Philippines (2012) -0,604 
Pakistan (2012) -0,648 
Kyrgyzstan (2011) -0,678 
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Appendix Map 9: the violent society 
 
-0,55
-0,33
-0,11
0,11
0,33
0,55
0,77
0,99
1,21
1,43
source: our ow n calculations and http://w w w .clearlyandsimply.com/clearly_and_simply/2009/06/choropleth-maps-w ith-excel.html  
 
 
Justifiable: For a man to beat his wife 0,844 
Justifiable: Parents beating children 0,802 
Justifiable: Violence against other people 0,771 
Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe 0,526 
Justifiable: Stealing property 0,485 
Justifiable: cheating on taxes 0,442 
Rwanda (2012) 1,213 
Philippines (2012) 0,718 
Zimbabwe (2012) 0,656 
Nigeria (2011) 0,547 
Singapore (2012) 0,546 
Poland (2012) -0,446 
South Korea (2010) -0,447 
Japan (2010) -0,462 
Romania (2012) -0,482 
Chile (2011) -0,548 
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Appendix Map 10: xenophobia and racism 
 
-0,61
-0,39
-0,16
0,07
0,29
0,52
0,75
0,97
1,20
1,43
source: our ow n calculations and http://w w w .clearlyandsimply.com/clearly_and_simply/2009/06/choropleth-maps-w ith-excel.html  
 
 
rejecting neighbours: People of a different race 0,810 
rejecting neighbours: People of a different religion 0,769 
rejecting neighbours: Immigrants/foreign workers 0,759 
Libya (2014) 1,199 
Azerbaijan (2011) 0,815 
Lebanon (2013) 0,712 
Palestine (2013) 0,681 
Malaysia (2012) 0,658 
South Korea (2010) 0,586 
Sweden (2011) -0,575 
Colombia (2012) -0,585 
Uruguay (2011) -0,599 
Trinidad and Tobago (2011) -
0,614 
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Appendix Map 11: happiness and economic well-being 
 
-0,70
-0,50
-0,30
-0,11
0,09
0,29
0,49
0,69
0,88
1,08
source: our ow n calculations and http://w w w .clearlyandsimply.com/clearly_and_simply/2009/06/choropleth-maps-w ith-excel.html  
 
 
Satisfaction with your life 0,810 
Satisfaction with financial situation of household 0,717 
Feeling of happiness (unhappy) -0,716 
Mexico (2012) 0,883 
Colombia (2012) 0,658 
Ecuador (2013) 0,620 
Armenia (2011) -0,530 
Iraq (2012) -0,548 
Zimbabwe (2012) -0,626 
Belarus (2011) -0,635 
Ukraine (2011) -0,685 
Tunisia (2013) -0,698 
Palestine (2013) -0,792 
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Appendix Map 12: lack of entrepreneurial spirit 
 
-1,34
-1,06
-0,78
-0,50
-0,22
0,06
0,34
0,62
0,90
1,18
source: our ow n calculations and http://w w w .clearlyandsimply.com/clearly_and_simply/2009/06/choropleth-maps-w ith-excel.html  
 
Schwartz: not important to be rich 0,626 
Schwartz: not important adventure and taking risks 0,616 
Schwartz: not important to think up new ideas and be creative 0,575 
Older people are a burden on society 0,368 
I do not see myself as a world citizen 0,354 
Azerbaijan (2011) 0,898 
Ukraine (2011) 0,556 
Japan (2010) 0,551 
Taiwan (2012) 0,497 
Romania (2012) 0,494 
Belarus (2011) 0,476 
Zimbabwe (2012) -0,511 
Rwanda (2012) -0,693 
Ghana (2012) -1,125 
Nigeria (2011) -1,340 
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Appendix Map 13: older generation with low education and high fertility 
 
-0,68
-0,52
-0,36
-0,20
-0,04
0,12
0,28
0,44
0,60
0,76
source: our ow n calculations and http://w w w .clearlyandsimply.com/clearly_and_simply/2009/06/choropleth-maps-w ith-excel.html  
 
 
How many children do you have 0,738 
Age 0,692 
Highest educational level attained -0,554 
Philippines (2012) 0,597 
Malaysia (2012) 0,458 
Ecuador (2013) 0,356 
Taiwan (2012) -0,302 
Algeria (2013) -0,315 
Russian Federaton (2011) -
0,344 
Cyprus (2011) -0,371 
Azerbaijan (2011) -0,476 
Libya (2014) -0,501 
Tunisia (2013) -0,679 
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Appendix Map 14: distrust in transnational capital and Universities 
 
-0,83
-0,60
-0,37
-0,14
0,09
0,32
0,55
0,78
1,01
1,24
source: our ow n calculations and http://w w w .clearlyandsimply.com/clearly_and_simply/2009/06/choropleth-maps-w ith-excel.html  
 
 
no Confidence: Major Companies 0,754 
no Confidence: Banks 0,675 
no Confidence: Universities 0,657 
no Confidence: The Civil Services 0,447 
no Confidence: The Press 0,337 
Jordan (2014) 1,013 
Tunisia (2013) 0,856 
Yemen (2014) 0,826 
Palestine (2013) 0,727 
Iraq (2012) 0,597 
Nigeria (2011) -0,525 
Estonia (2011) -0,554 
Zimbabwe (2012) -0,567 
Taiwan (2012) -0,596 
Ghana (2012) -0,834 
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Appendix Map 15: anti-Hayek/anti-Max Weber 
 
-0,99
-0,79
-0,59
-0,39
-0,19
0,01
0,21
0,41
0,61
0,82
source: our ow n calculations and http://w w w .clearlyandsimply.com/clearly_and_simply/2009/06/choropleth-maps-w ith-excel.html  
 
Hard work does not bring success 0,780 
Competition good or harmful 0,748 
Private vs state ownership of business 0,402 
Azerbaijan (2011) 0,615 
Poland (2012) 0,553 
Kazakhstan (2011) 0,496 
Ukraine (2011) 0,465 
Russian Federaton (2011) 0,447 
Trinidad and Tobago (2011) -0,471 
Tunisia (2013) -0,486 
Libya (2014) -0,499 
Uzbekistan (2011) -0,534 
Yemen (2014) -0,995 
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Appendix Map 16: rejecting work, global citizenship; but social trust 
 
-0,91
-0,63
-0,35
-0,07
0,20
0,48
0,76
1,04
1,32
1,59
source: our ow n calculations and http://w w w .clearlyandsimply.com/clearly_and_simply/2009/06/choropleth-maps-w ith-excel.html  
 
 
not important in life: Work 0,627 
Most people can be trusted/you just can't be too careful -
0,482 
I do not see myself as a world citizen 0,419 
How important is God in your life -0,377 
Justifiable: divorce 0,345 
Highest educational level attained 0,328 
Netherlands (2012) 1,315 
United States (2011) 1,000 
Sweden (2011) 0,986 
Australia (2012) 0,969 
Japan (2010) 0,726 
Belarus (2011) 0,703 
Uzbekistan (2011) -0,727 
Mexico (2012) -0,763 
Ghana (2012) -0,889 
Ecuador (2013) -0,909 
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Appendix Map 17: supporting gender justice 
 
-0,90
-0,71
-0,52
-0,33
-0,13
0,06
0,25
0,44
0,63
0,82
source: our ow n calculations and http://w w w .clearlyandsimply.com/clearly_and_simply/2009/06/choropleth-maps-w ith-excel.html  
 
Gender (female) 0,652 
reject: University is more important for a boy than for a girl
 0,545 
reject: Jobs scarce: Men should have more right to a job than 
women 0,536 
Democracy: Women have the same rights as men. 0,330 
Sweden (2011) 0,627 
Australia (2012) 0,612 
Palestine (2013) -0,636 
Libya (2014) -0,693 
Iraq (2012) -0,706 
Tunisia (2013) -0,707 
Yemen (2014) -0,774 
Azerbaijan (2011) -0,799 
Pakistan (2012) -0,895 
Jordan (2014) -0,897 
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Appendix Map 18: educational value: independence not obedience 
 
-0,75
-0,56
-0,37
-0,18
0,00
0,19
0,38
0,57
0,75
0,94
source: our ow n calculations and http://w w w .clearlyandsimply.com/clearly_and_simply/2009/06/choropleth-maps-w ith-excel.html  
 
 
Important child qualities: independence 0,666 
Important child qualities: obedience -0,591 
Important child qualities: unselfishness -0,528 
Important child qualities: feeling of responsibility 0,342 
Sweden (2011) 0,754 
Taiwan (2012) 0,727 
Azerbaijan (2011) 0,702 
South Korea (2010) 0,701 
Japan (2010) 0,598 
Netherlands (2012) 0,516 
Colombia (2012) -0,543 
Ecuador (2013) -0,615 
Rwanda (2012) -0,678 
Ghana (2012) -0,746 
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Appendix Map 19: staying away from environmental activism 
 
-0,74
-0,57
-0,40
-0,23
-0,06
0,11
0,28
0,45
0,62
0,79
source: our ow n calculations and http://w w w .clearlyandsimply.com/clearly_and_simply/2009/06/choropleth-maps-w ith-excel.html  
 
Past two years: not participated in demonstration for environment
 0,726 
Past two years: not given money to ecological organization
 0,724 
Tunisia (2013) 0,616 
Azerbaijan (2011) 0,601 
Jordan (2014) 0,543 
Palestine (2013) 0,458 
Colombia (2012) -0,451 
Mexico (2012) -0,467 
Peru (2012) -0,471 
Australia (2012) -0,519 
Netherlands (2012) -0,556 
Sweden (2011) -0,738 
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Appendix Map 20: „fatigue of democracy“ 
 
-0,88
-0,61
-0,35
-0,08
0,19
0,45
0,72
0,99
1,25
1,52
source: our ow n calculations and http://w w w .clearlyandsimply.com/clearly_and_simply/2009/06/choropleth-maps-w ith-excel.html  
 
 
Importance of democracy -0,702 
Active/Inactive membership of sport or recreation -0,392 
never attend religious services 0,350 
Past two years: not given money to ecological organization
 0,342 
Sweden (2011) 1,255 
Uruguay (2011) 1,110 
Colombia (2012) 0,872 
Australia (2012) 0,806 
Netherlands (2012) 0,633 
Ukraine (2011) -0,642 
Kyrgyzstan (2011) -0,686 
Kazakhstan (2011) -0,691 
Belarus (2011) -0,776 
Uzbekistan (2011) -0,881 
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Appendix Map 21: egoism of the rich 
 
-1,03
-0,74
-0,45
-0,16
0,12
0,41
0,70
0,98
1,27
1,56
source: our ow n calculations and http://w w w .clearlyandsimply.com/clearly_and_simply/2009/06/choropleth-maps-w ith-excel.html  
 
Satisfaction with financial situation of household 0,620 
Most people can be trusted/you just can't be too careful
 0,562 
Justifiable: divorce 0,463 
Yemen (2014) 1,271 
Pakistan (2012) 0,947 
Libya (2014) 0,763 
Jordan (2014) 0,627 
Malaysia (2012) 0,576 
Estonia (2011) -0,658 
Australia (2012) -0,712 
Cyprus (2011) -0,726 
Sweden (2011) -0,733 
Slovenia (2011) -1,025 
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Appendix Map 22: imagination versus ecological responsibility 
 
-0,74
-0,58
-0,43
-0,28
-0,12
0,03
0,18
0,34
0,49
0,64
source: our ow n calculations and http://w w w .clearlyandsimply.com/clearly_and_simply/2009/06/choropleth-maps-w ith-excel.html  
 
 
Active/Inactive membership of environmental organization
 -0,680 
Important child qualities: imagination 0,506 
Important child qualities: feeling of responsibility -0,460 
never attend religious services 0,353 
Pakistan (2012) 0,490 
Turkey (2011) 0,395 
Algeria (2013) 0,362 
Lebanon (2013) 0,319 
Nigeria (2011) 0,306 
Rwanda (2012) 0,284 
Chile (2011) -0,289 
Poland (2012) -0,339 
Yemen (2014) -0,413 
Netherlands (2012) -0,737 
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Appendix Map 23: hating the Army and sports 
 
-0,51
-0,35
-0,19
-0,03
0,13
0,29
0,45
0,61
0,77
0,93
source: our ow n calculations and http://w w w .clearlyandsimply.com/clearly_and_simply/2009/06/choropleth-maps-w ith-excel.html  
 
 
 
no Confidence: Armed Forces 0,775 
Active/Inactive membership of sport or recreation -0,518 
Uzbekistan (2011) 0,773 
Azerbaijan (2011) 0,437 
Armenia (2011) 0,435 
Kyrgyzstan (2011) 0,356 
Zimbabwe (2012) 0,336 
Ecuador (2013) -0,375 
Netherlands (2012) -0,393 
China (2012) -0,416 
Poland (2012) -0,498 
Sweden (2011) -0,510 
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